After liberal hegemony: What's next?

 

When the United Kingdom decided to leave the European Union (EU) and Donald Trump was elected to his first presidency in 2016, a lively debate about the state of the liberal international order started. Some observers called it “rigged” and demanded to “fix it now or watch it wither”. Outspoken critics of the liberal international order even proclaimed that the era “after liberal hegemony”had dawned. Meanwhile, many experts believe that what was once called “liberal international order” does not exist anymore. To understand why this is the case and what kind of international order will be and already has been emerging, we have to take a closer look at the reasons for its decay.

The liberal international order that was created after World War II, under the auspices of the “benign hegemon” of the United States, resulted in a system of rules-based multilateralism that originally focussed on promoting free trade as its main objective. However, the kind of economic order that was envisaged was made for the Western world and accompanied by a weak human rights regime of the United Nations (UN) and a United Nations Security Council paralyzed by decision-making procedures that allowed the permanent five members China, France, the (then) Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States to block any decision with their veto. Only with the end of the Cold War were multilateral institutions, especially of the UN system, entrusted with strengthening human rights and promoting democracy and the rule of law on a global level. Hence, the liberal international order that was established after the Cold War is characterized by distinct ideational and institutional properties: On an ideational level, core liberal values suggest promoting the rights of the individual and enhancing its welfare. Therefore, the purpose of liberal institutions is to curb the state’s power vis-à-vis its citizens. On an institutional level, liberal values lead to decision rules that foster inclusive, equal and fair participation as well as equality before the law. Equipped with such a social purpose and aspiring to realize the decision rules according to liberal values, the system of global governance that was created

during the 1990s has contributed to increasing not only the authority of multilateral institutions epitomized by a series of landmark conferences, in which new conventions and norms with varying degrees of commitment were adopted. It also led to an increase in regional intergovernmental organizations and broadened the landscape of actors engaged in global policy processes, including a multitude of stakeholders like Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), business and philanthropic foundations. This has also been accompanied by a growing number of international non-state and multistakeholder organizations [see Figure 1] and has gone hand in hand with further institutionalizing norms and rules that help to organize cooperation and provide public goods. Moreover, using the knowledge of scientific experts for policy advice has become increasingly institutionalized, with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change as one of the more prominent examples. At the same time, the 1990s saw the advent of “liberal peacebuilding” associated with not only ending violent (especially intra-state) conflicts but also democratizing post-conflict states and liberalizing their economies as part of a liberal development process.

Conventional international bodies comprise federations of international organizations, universal membership organizations, intercontinental membership organizations, regionally defined membership organizations. Other international bodies comprise organizations emanating from places, persons or other bodies, organizations having a special form, including foundations, funds, internationally oriented national organizations.

Compared to what the liberal international order promised to achieve, even sympathetic observers must admit that it never lived up to its aspirations and exhibited a good deal of hypocrisy on the part of Western countries. There are several reasons that have contributed to this blunt diagnosis: 

• The spread of (nominal) democracies (such as in Eastern Europe) in the 1990s and the increase in economic exchange in the wake of globalization have led to gains in prosperity. However, these are unevenly distributed, leading to increased economic and social inequalities within and between societies worldwide, even in established democracies.

 China, as the most prominent example of a developing country that could reap economic benefits from the liberalization of the global economy and its globalization, has become the main economic competitor of the United States. In turn, the domestic consensus within the United States to support open markets and the institutions associated with it has declined considerably, as reflected in the protectionist policies of the first and even more the second Trump administration. 

• In particular, the “war on terror” made it very clear to other countries that liberal democratic states operate according to double standards, for instance by demanding global compliance with human rights and rule-of-law standards but not consistently adhering to them themselves. 

• The hope that externally initiated “state-building” would lead to sustainable stability in post-conflict societies and to their “modernization” has lately proven illusory, especially in many interventions initiated by Western states. This misjudgement became particularly clear with the hasty withdrawal of Western troops from Afghanistan in August 2021, followed, amongst others, by the termination of the UN-led mission in Mali in December 2023 as ultimately demanded by the military government of Mali. 

• Finally, the actions and behaviour of Western countries during the years of the COVID-19 pandemic, characterized by national egoism, have led to a significant decline in their reputation in the countries of the Global South. Consequently, for instance by emphasizing questions of loss and damage due to climate change, the latter are now addressing issues of justice and greater redistribution more forcefully. These developments have led to a loss of legitimacy and growing mistrust of “the West.” In contrast, China has been able to gain recognition for its development model in countries of the Global South through increasingly active, primarily bilateral cooperation. This also explains why Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was not unanimously condemned by an overwhelming majority of countries in the Global South, especially in Africa. The Russian narrative of a West that wanted to annex Ukraine and against whose aggression Russia must now defend itself falls on fertile ground worldwide. Russia’s propagated view of Western liberal democratic societies as “corrupt,” “soft,” and “decadent” resonates also in other countries. In addition, Russia is politically and economically important to many countries in the Global South as a military and security partner and as exporter of oil, gas, grain and fertilizer. The list of setbacks of the liberal international order and the open contestation of it, even by its former proponents, does not indicate that the post-Cold War liberal international order will be reinvigorated. Even those in favour of liberal values do not think it should. And critics put it quite bluntly that the end of Western dominance will be “a good thing for the world as a whole”, since “the major benefits of the present order have gone disproportionately to the West at the expense of the Rest, thanks to predatory colonization, violence, racism, and injustice”. In view of such little support of the current liberal international order how could an emerging or future international order look like? 

Traditionally, the idea of a stable international order is related to the notion that the international system is hierarchically structured. In other words, a state or groups of states are in command of a considerably greater share of power that enable them to take over a leading position. All current concepts of international order acknowledge that international relations are characterized by different forms of interdependence, i.e. mutual dependence, especially as far as trade and security is concerned [see Table 1]. The liberal international system created after World War II is a distinct type of a hierarchical system led by the United States as benign hegemon. In terms of ideology, security and military might the international order that developed after World War II and lasted until the end of the Cold War is also described as bipolar with two superpowers (Soviet Union and United States) that represented two different political and economic systems. Since the 1990s, the liberal international system dominated by the United States as “indispensable nation” is called a liberal hegemony. 

Many observers look upon the international system of today as one of multipolarity, since it is not dominated by only one but several great powers, with their (different kinds of) material capacity approximately equally distributed. In contrast to the liberal hegemony, which furthered multilateral cooperation, especially within the UN system, multipolarity with its great power competition is looked upon as impeding meaningful results of multilateral cooperation, also because of focusing on exclusionary regional blocs. An alternative concept of international order is based on the idea of multiplexity analogous to a multiplex cinema where a selection of different films is on offer. A multiplex order also starts from the assumption that no single global hegemon dominates, although power imbalances and hierarchies still exist. However, instead of looking at the (material) power of the leading states, the interaction capacity of state and non-state actors is seen as the main driver of establishing order. Interaction capacity “is a way of looking at international systems/societies in terms of their carrying capacity for information, goods and people, and the speed, range and cost with which these things can be done”. There is a material aspect of interaction capacity that influences the limits and characteristics of every type of exchange from trade to war or even cultural relations. Interaction, however, is also facilitated by primary and secondary institutions: “International law and diplomacy work this way as primary institutions, and secondary institutions such as banking systems and forum organizations like the UN respectively facilitate financial transactions and diplomatic interaction”. In contrast to the other two models of international order, multiplexity acknowledges the diversity of actors that is reflected in the growing number of internationally active non-state organizations [see Figure  1]. Multiplexity also looks at the multitude of interdependent sectoral fields of action that lead to a complex, cross-level architecture of global governance, and great cultural, ideological, and political diversity. An essential feature of multiplexity is its “multiscalarity”, i.e. problems exist and interact at multiple scales that transcend clear-cut geographical realms. This entails also that actors do not act on one distinct level only, but across issue areas and levels that are not neatly separated anymore. As a result, the notion of multiplexity describes an international order with a greater variety of interdependent relationships. To establish the amount of interaction capacity one state commands, use “the ability to negotiate and formalize cooperation through international agreements, including treaty-making”. The dataset they have constructed does not only encompass the issue areas of economic cooperation or peace and security, but also agreements on natural resources and the environment, human and social development, governance and institutions and what the authors call “connectivity” (cooperation in border management, communication and logistics networks, transportation infrastructure and international migration). Like the increase in international institutions, also the overall number of treaties signed within a 15-year period increased steadily with a peak period after the end of the Cold War between 1991 and 2005 [see Figure 2].

The constantly high numbers of treaties relating to economic cooperation and integration reflect the focus of the liberal international order on economic issues. However, starting with the wave of decolonization that manifested itself especially in the 1960s, issues of human and social development also gained prominence. Remarkably, treaty-making on natural resources and environment lags visibly behind all other areas. Many of the problems associated with this issue area belong to the category of “long problems” since their “causes and effects span more than one human generation”. What is also striking, is the decline of treaty-making after 2006. Although the last period does not cover 15 years like the periods before and although it takes some time between signing and registering a treaty, the numbers seem to reflect the growing contestation of the existing order and its institutions. So, what does this mean for the future of multilateral cooperation?